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Criminal Law-Use of Deadly Force in Preventing Escape of Fleeing
Minor Felon
Under a new statute' any misdemeanant confined in the North Carolina State Prison upon a second conviction of an escape or an attempt
to escape is guilty of a felony. North Carolina prison directives provide that fleeing felons may be shot only if clearly necessary to prevent
escape. 2
Interpreting N. C. Gen Stat. § 148-46 (1952), which provides that
when a convict shall attempt to escape, the prison guard shall use any
means necessary to prevent the escape, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has held that the legislature did not intend to change the common
law rule that a prison guard is not justified in killing a fleeing misdemeanant merely to prevent escape.3 However, in the case of the fleeing felon the common law authorities are unanimous in their opinion
4
that deadly force may, if necessary, be used to prevent escape.
There can be little criticism of the rule as it operated under the
common law. In the first place, felonies were punishable by death.r
Secondly, at a time when officers did not possess our deadly and accurate firearms, it would be difficult to imagine a" situation where an officer would have an opportunity to kill a fleeing felon who was not
resisting arrest on the spot. G Thirdly, it would be unusual for the
arresting officer at common law to find it necessary to kill to prevent
the escape of a felon, since the criminal did not have modern means of
transportation, nor could he find concealment and anonymity so easily.
It would seem, however, that the common law rule can be justly
criticized as it operates on fleeing felons who have committed some
statutory felony, such as the escape offense set out in N. C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-256, or some felony not dangerous to life. The question is what
justification can there be for the use of deadly force in preventing the
escape of the minor felon. 7 Is it punishment for the original offense
or the offense of escaping, for neither of which the statutory penalty
is death? Is it to uphold the lawful authority in the arresting person
or the one preventing escape? If so, the rule should logically be the
N.
C. GEN. STAT. § 14-256 (1955).
N. C. PRISON RULES AND REGULATIONS, c. 41, Directive 21 (Oct. 1953).
'Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 136 S. E. 375, 50 A. L. R. 262 (1927).
The common law authorities made no distinction between a misdeanant fleeing from arrest and one breaking away after arrest.
' 1 EAST P. C. 298 (1806) ; 2 HALE P. C. 76-77 (1847) ; 1 HAWK. P. C. 106
(1788).
14 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 98 (1818).
' The case of an offender who is merely fleeing must, of course, be distinguished
from the case where the offender is resisting (State v. Dunning, 177 N. C. 559,
98 S. E. 530 (1919)), or is both resisting and fleeing (State v. Garrett, 60 N. C.
144 (1863)).
'7Arguments pro and con are contained in 9 ALI PROCEEDINGS 179 (1931).
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same as regards both felon and misdemeanant. Is it to prevent a more
probable danger to life? Statutory felonies include a multitude of
non-violent crimes and some misdemeanors are much more dangerous
to life; for example, contrast the fleeing drunken driver with the fleeing thief. Is it because the minor felon is considered more dangerous
to property? The better reasoned cases hold that deadly force is not8
justified in preventing a felony where property loss alone is involved.
"The reason why the use of such means was allowed to prevent crimes of that kind in England was that they were there
punishable by death. This being so, there was reason for the
rule. If one was about to perpetrate a crime for which under
the law his life would be forfeited there was reason in holding
that his life might be taken if necessary to prevent his committing it. But in this country few crimes subject the ones who
have committed them to the death penalty, and it is only as to
those which do that the reason of the rule has any force. What
were felonies at common law usually subject the offender here
to comparatively light punishment, and upon principle it should
be here held that one could only properly make use of means
which might be expected to cause death to prevent the commission of a capital offense." 9
It would seem, therefore, that the reason for the rule has changed also
in the arresting or escaping situation ;1o for if one cannot kill to prevent
a felony dangerous to property only, should he be permitted to kill in
attempting an arrest after the offense has been completed?
Writers generally criticize the arbitrary distinctions made between
the misdemeanant and the felon.""To attach such importance to a term so loosely used is to
make legal rights and duties dependent upon words, not upon
facts or public policy. It is as vicious an exhibition of the jurisprudence of conceptions as can well be imagined. The word is
the thing. It is of itself a magic quality which compels legal re8 Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329 (1881) ; Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21
P. 2d 1112 (1933) ; Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 151 Ky. 496, 152-S. W. 580 (1913) ;
Commonwealth v. Emmons, 57 Pa. Super. 445, 43 A.2d 568- (1945); Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923).
'Hoyt, C. J., in State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 487, 39 Pac. 1080, 1082 (1895).
"oAs in the case of a misdemeanant, the common law authorities made no distinction between a felon fleeing from arrest and one breaking away after arrest.

Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 508, 18 S. W. 854, 855 (1892).

' Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers
and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L. J. 525, 540 (1926) ; Pearson, The Right to
Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MIcH. L. Rav. 957, 974 (1930); Rogers, Right of
Offlcer to Shoot and Kill Fleeing Felon, 34 LAw NOTES 66, 70 (1930); Contra,
Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 448, 466

(1931).
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suits regardless of the facts or of the interest at stake.
ridiculous to make matters of life and death depend
mere whim of the legislative draftsman and to subject
the risk of death merely because the crime which he
mitted is arbitrarily labelled a 'felony' rather than
meanor?-12
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It is significant that the Restatement of Torts has recognized that the
proper distinction is between offenses which normally cause or threaten
3
death and those which do not.'

Although criticized by many courts,' 4 the applicability of the rule
in regard to the minor felon seems to be largely untested by actual
court holding.' 5 In Ex parte Warner,'8 however, a federal revenue
agent who claimed he shot a fleeing "moonshiner" by accident was discharged from state custody on writ of habeas corpus. From the evidence presented, the court, relying on the common law rule, said that
the petitioner should be discharged "whether the view taken of the
evidence be that the officer deliberately shot at the deceased while he
was fleeing and escaping from arrest or that in the pursuit the pistol
was accidentally discharged."' 17 Although it would seem that the illegal
manufacture of whiskey is not per se a felony dangerous to life, it cannot be denied that an aura of violence surrounds the profession.1 8
Since an arresting person can only kill if necessary to prevent the
escape of a fleeing felon, many cases are decided on the ground that
the killing was unnecessary. Consequently, if the killing is unnecessary,
there is no need for the court to try to make any distinction between
types of felonies. In justifying the use of deadly force, the burden is
on defendant to the extent of showing authority and probable cause to
overcome a prima facie presumption for the protection of life unless
12 Bohlen and Bums, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers
and18Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L. J. 525, 540 (1926).
R STATEMENT, TORTS § 131 (1934).
14 U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1881) ; State v. Bryant, 65 N. C.
327, 328 (1871); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1110, 178 S.E. 8,11 (1935).
15 In the following cases the court made no distinction between types of felonies in the escaping situation: Commonwealth v. Stinnet, 55 F. 2d 644 (4th Cir.
1932) (illegal manufacture of whiskey); U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (8th Cir.
1881) (attempted escape from military custody of soldier convicted of malicious
falsehood which carried two year sentence in military prison); Johnson v.
Chesapeake Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S. W. 2d 521 (1935) (larceny); Thompson
v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 116 W. Va. 705, 182 S.E. 880 (1935) (illegal manufacture of whiskey).
'621
F. 2d 542 (N. D. Okla. 1927).
17
Id. at 542.
18 "It is a matter of common knowledge that throughout the years men who
secrete themselves in the fastness of the mountains for the purpose of illicit distillation of spiritous liquors have not been hesitant to take the lives of officers
attempting to bring them to justice." Maxwell, J. in Thompson v. Norfolk and
W. Ry. Co., 116 W. Va. 705, 712, 182 S.E. 880, 884 (1935).
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the circumstances of the killing rebut the presumption.19 Necessity
is a question for the jury and it may be that both jury and appellate
judge2 ° take into account the character of the felony and perhaps the
21
character of the felon himself.
In State v. Bryant,2 2 a hog was stolen from defendant's employer
and the defendant, a private person, suspecting that Cogdell was the
thief went to Cogdell's house, called him out and told him to give up
the hog. Cogdell said that the hog was not there and fled. The defendant ordered him four times to stop and then shot him. The stolen
hog was found in Cogdell's house cut up and cleaned. The defendant
urged that he knew a felony had been committed and thus he had a
right to arrest the felon without a warrant and to prevent the felon's
escape. On these facts, the trial judge held that the defendant was
guilty of assault and battery and so charged the jury. On appeal, in
a per curiam opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court said that
it was the privilege of every private person to arrest the felon when
a felony has been committed but held that here there was no necessity
to kill. Justice Reade, speaking for the court, said: "It must be however, that the powers of arresting and the means used must be enlarged
or modified by the characted of the felony. The importance to society of
having felons arrested in cases of capital felonies such as murder and
rape must be much greater than in cases of inferior felonies." 23
24
On the question of necessity, although the rule is not settled,
some courts follow the view that mere suspicion that a felony has been
committed is not enough to justify the use of deadly force in preventing
the escape of a suspected felon if in fact no felony has been committed.2 5
Even where a felony has been committed, killing can only be justified
as a last resort.20 Although it has been said that the officer, in case of
resistance, is not bound to put off the arrest until a more favorable
time, 27 ordinarily there is not the same urgency in case of fight.28 In
Castle v. Lewis29 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of a district court in dismissing an application for habeas
Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 477, 118 So. 794, 802 (1928).

1"

20 Hendricks v. Comonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1110, 78 S. E. 8, 11 (1935).

-1 Dredd v. State, 26 Ala. App. 594, 164 So. 309, 311 (1935).
2265

N. C. 327 (1871).

"State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871).
"' See Notes, 38 Ky L. J. 609 and 618.
- Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W. 297 (1902); People v. Conraddy, 5 Parker Cr. Rep. 234 (N. Y. 1860); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa.

Super. 484, 45 A. 2d 235 (1946).
26 Castle v. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (8th Cir. 1918); Scarborough v. State, 168
Tenn. 106, 76 S. W. 2d 106 (1934); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S. W.

94 (1921).

Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 188, 136 S. E. 375, 377 (1927).
State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 328, 329 (1871).
20254 Fed. 917 (8th Cir. 1918).
27
26
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corpus by two petitioners in state custody who had tried to arrest certain persons whom they suspected were introducing liquor into Osage
County, Oklahoma (a felony). The suspected ones had fled in an automobile and the petitioners had fired their guns at the automobile and
killed one 'losier. The court felt that the fact that all the occupants
of the car except one were known by the officers to be settled residents
of a nearby town only five miles away and the fact that the suspected
ones were heading toward their homes at the time rendered it difficult
to conclude that a person of ordinary prudence could have believed that
it was necessary to fire into the automobile to prevent escape.
Concluding, it seems that even if the North Carolina Supreme Court
does not follow the strong dicta enounced in State v. Bryant which distinguished between types of felonies, an arresting or custodial officer
may find it difficult to show necessity for the use of deadly force in
preventing the escape of the minor felon.
I. B. HUDSON, JR.
Domestic Relations-Conflict of Laws-Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
In a suit brought in Arkansas under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act' thd petitioner filed the necessary papers, 2 which
were certified and sent to the Superior Court of Edgecombe County3
and which charged her husband with non-support of their children.
After concluding that responsibility to support the children had " '...
already been found to exist by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . in
the State of Arkansas,' 1 the superior court entered judgment, requiring the husband to pay into the Edgecombe County Welfare Department the money for support, which was to be forwarded to Arkansas,
to be transmitted to petitioner, then residing in Virginia.3
On appeal the judgment of the lower court was reversed, the reason
being the three-state nature of the proceedings in this case. In the
opinion it was said:
"We do not think the act should be interpreted so as to apply
to a situation other than one where the obligee is present in the
Initiating State .... To interpret the act so as to permit an
1
9A UNIFORm LAWs ANN. 58 (Supp. 1954); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2401
to 34-2427 (Supp. 1953); N. C. GFN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to 52A-19 (Supp. 1953).
Arkansas had repealed the 1950 Uniform Act, 9A ULA 58, 66 (Supp. 1954),
and adopted it as amended in 1952, 9A ULA 58, 92 (Supp. 1954). North Carolina had adopted substantially the Uniform Act of 1950. For a discussion of the
North Carolina Act see Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 351, 423 (1951).
2
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2410 (Supp. 1953).
3
ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-2413 (Supp. 1953).
' Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 643, 83 S. E. 2d 706, 708 (1954).
Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 83 S. E. 2d 706 (1954).

